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THE PREMERGER DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN 
ACQUIRER AND TARGET FIRMS
Alövsat MÜSLÜMOV
Doğuş University, Department o f Management
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the premerger discrimination between acquirers 
and targets using a sample of 56 mergers from U.S. economy. The research findings 
indicate that acquirers and targets discriminate in terms of size, liquidity and cash 
flow dimensions, while no statistically significant discrimination are detected in 
terms of growth potential, past market returns and operating efficiency. The 
subsample studies show that diversifying mergers aim to exploit cash flow potential 
of targets, whereas related mergers focus on growth potential. The premerger 
financial properties of acquirer and targets bear informational clues about method of 
payment in mergers. Strategic analysis of portfolio shifts show that value acquirers 
aim to purchase companies with higher growth potential, whereas growth bidders 
aim to purchase companies with stronger cash flow record.
Key words: Mergers, Acquisitions, Premerger Discrimination, Method o f Payment, 
Book-to Market Ratios, Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test.
ÖZET: Bu araştırmada ABD ekonomisine ait 56 şirket birleşmeleri örnek alınarak, 
birleşen firmaların birleşme öncesi farklılıkları analiz edilmektedir. Araştırma bul­
guları birleşen firmaların birleşme öncesinde şirket büyüklüğü, likidite ve nakit akış­
larına göre istatiksel olarak anlamlı farklılıkları olduğunu, büyüme potansiyeli, geç­
miş pazar getirileri ve faaliyet etkinliği açısından ise istatiksel olarak anlamlı fark­
lılıkların olmadığını göstermiştir. Alt örnek analizleri dikey şirket birleşmelerinin te­
mel amacının satın alınan firmaların güçlü nakit akışlarını elde etmek, yatay şirket 
birleşmelerinin temel amacının ise büyüme ve gelişme amaçlı yapıldığını göster­
mektedir. Birleşme öncesi satın alan ve satın alınan firmaların finansal özellikleri 
şirket birleşmelerinde kullanılabilecek ödeme yöntemi hakkında bilgi içeriği taşı­
maktadır. Satın alan firmanın portföy değişiminin stratejik analizi düşük gelişme 
perspektifi olan firmaların yüksek büyüme istikametinde, yüksek gelişme perspek­
tifi olan firmaların ise nakit akışlarını kuvvetlendirmek istikametinde şirket birleş­
melerine gittikleri tespit edilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Şirket Birleşmeleri, Birleşme Öncesi Farklılıklar, Ödeme Yön­
temi, Piyasa Değeri/Defter Değeri, Wilcoxon Testi.
I. INTRODUCTION
The merger decision is a portfolio diversification and external growth decision 
aiming to gain competitive advantage through synergy by combining activities of
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two companies. Whatever the sources of the expected synergy from mergers, it is 
believed that larger companies who have sufficient funds to finance the deal and are 
eligible to create more synergy initiate mergers bids. However, there are some 
merger deals in the today’s economies that challenge this established rule and imply 
that there could be some other factors that determine the acquirer.
This paper is going to analyze the premerger discrimination between acquirer and 
targets. For this purpose, I study a sample of 56 mergers between U.S. public 
industrial companies announced and completed between 1992 and 1997. 
Specifically, I study whether acquirer and target companies discriminate in terms of 
size, liquidity, growth, cash flows, past market returns and operating efficiency 
dimensions. The Wilcoxon signed rank test and binomial test is used to test 
discrimination between acquirer and targets across these financial dimensions. I also 
study whether method of payment, business overlap degree of acquirer and target 
industries, and growth potential of acquirers matter in the premerger discrimination 
acquirer and targets.
Research results indicate that acquirers are much bigger than their targets. Acquirers 
retain statistically significant higher liquidity than targets for cash bid purposes. 
Evaluation of strategic dimensions of the merger indicates that bidders takeover 
targets with stronger cash flow record, while growth dimension is neglected. The 
subsample analysis shows that related mergers invests in the future viability of firm 
through acquiring high-growth firms reflected in the price-to-book ratios of targets, 
whereas diversifying mergers are focused on acquiring targets with high cash flow 
record. Method of payment of merger has also a deep trace in the merger parties’ 
financial properties. Firms that offer cash to targets retain high liquidity and are 
much larger than their targets. The value acquirers targets with higher growth 
potential, whereas growth bidders aim to purchase companies with strong cash 
flows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes sample and 
data used in the study. Section III describes research predictions, variables, 
subsamples and statistical tests used in the study. Section IV analyzes premerger 
discrimination between acquirer and targets. Section V gives a brief conclusion.
II. DATA
2.1. Sources
I have two main sources of data. Merger data come from Mergerstat database, which 
reports the exact date of the merger announcements, the deal size and other relevant 
information about acquirer and targets.
The balance sheet, income statement and market data are retrieved from Compustat 
(North America) database. This database contains up to 20 years of annual, 12 years 
of quarterly, seven years of business and geographic segment, and 240 months of 
stock prices and dividend data. This database retains financial and market data for 
over 10,300 active and 7,600 inactive U.S. and Canadian companies that no longer
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file with the Securities and Exchange Commission due to a merger, liquidation, or 
bankruptcy, etc.
2.2. Sample
The sample of 629 mergers in US economy, which is announced and completed 
between 1992 and 1997, are drawn from Mergerstat. The banks, insurance, and 
railroad companies are subject to different regulations, therefore, they are excluded 
from the sample. Since public concern is triggered by large merger deals due to their 
effects on the competition, I exclude the merger transactions valued at less than $ 
350 million from my sample space.
The mergers gains economic significance when target’s relative size to acquirer’s is 
significant. Therefore, I put another restriction of relative size: the size of target 
should exceed 5% of the size of acquirer. Target company size is computed from 
Compustat as the market value of common stock plus the net debt and preferred 
stock at the beginning of the year before the acquisition.
Data availability in Compustat database imposes another restriction on the sample. 
Since some variables are computed over three-year premerger window, the 
acquiring and target companies are required to have at least, three years premerger 
financial and market data available on the Compustat tapes.
As a result of these restrictions, the sample space of 629 mergers reduced to 56 
merger cases.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. Testable Predictions
Financial literature predicts that some variables may have profound effects on the 
natural selection of acquirer and target in the merger process. I test whether acquirer 
and targets are discriminated in terms of financial dimensions in the premerger period.
Undoubtedly, the relative size of the acquirer and target companies is the most 
important determinant of the selection of acquirer in the merger process. Generally, 
larger companies afford to buy smaller ones, since they have sufficient funds for 
takeovers. Smaller companies attempt to buy larger companies only if they are fully 
backed by capital markets or other larger companies. Therefore, I predict:
Prediction 1. Acquirers are bigger than their targets.
The arguments are twofold about relative cash flow strength and operating 
efficiency of the merger parties. If the target and acquirer companies are about in the 
same size, the company with stronger financial and operational record is expected 
to launch the merger bid. However, if the acquirer is larger than target, it will desire 
to takeover the target with a strong cash flow record hoping synergetic gains. 
Considering that in only 4 merger cases targets are larger than acquirers out of 56 
mergers, I predict:
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Prediction 2. Targets have higher cash flows than their acquirers.
Prediction 3. Targets have higher operating efficiency than their acquirers.
If the companies’ sizes of two candidate companies are nearly equal, then company 
with higher price to book ratios are more eligible to be acquirer, since market favors 
growth companies, though the merger decisions of these companies may not be 
value increasing and may be infected by hubris (Rau and Vermaelen (1998)). The 
same reasoning applies to the past stock price performance of targets. A good past 
market performance may make companies to be acquirers, since market favors their 
merger decisions. However, if acquirers are larger than targets, acquirers may desire 
to takeover targets with higher growth potential and market performance. Regarding 
the fact that acquirers are larger than targets in our sample, next predictions follow.
Prediction 4. Targets have higher price to book ratios than their acquirers.
Prediction 5. Targets have higher market returns than their acquirers.
The function of liquidity in the selection process of acquirer and targets is very 
interesting. In practice, companies invest large sums of money in very liquid assets. 
A company’s decision to invest in liquid assets requires careful consideration of both 
the costs and benefits of holding liquid assets. Investment in liquid assets (e.g., 
treasury securities) is costly because the company incurs transaction costs when 
buying and selling financial securities, and because they lead to higher taxation 
(relative to stockholders holding such securities directly). Moreover, liquid assets 
may endanger more severe agency problems than less liquid assets. Despite these 
costs, companies will generally maintain some cash and cash equivalents for 
business transaction needs. Excess liquidity can also be maintained for 
"precautionary" and "speculative" motives. The precautionary motive argues that 
companies maintain excess liquidity to take advantage of profitable future 
investments. One of these potentially profitable future investments is a takeover. It 
could be argued that acquirer companies are trying to accumulate excess liquidity 
for merger purposes. Therefore, acquirer companies are supposed to be more liquid 
than targets. I predict:
Prediction 6. Acquirers have higher liquidity than their targets.
3.2. Variables
According to research predictions, I examine size, cash flow, operating efficiency, 
price-to-book ratio, market return, and liquidity dimensions.
The size (SIZE) of companies is measured by the market value of equity plus the 
book values of net debt and preferred stock. I use market value of equity to provide 
a measure that is comparable for all companies. Cash flows is measured by return 
on assets (ROA) defined as earnings before tax, interest, and depreciation (EBITD) 
scaled by company size (SIZE).
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The empirical proxy used to measure operating efficiency is the sales on total 
employment (SALEFF). Growth potential is measured by price to book ratio 
(MKBK), which is the ratio of the market value of the company’s assets to the book 
value.
Two different empirical proxies are employed to measure market returns; three-year 
(TRT3Y) and one-year total market return (TRT1Y) prior to the announcement of 
merger bid. The market return proxies are annualized rate of returns reflecting 
cumulative monthly price appreciations plus reinvestment of monthly dividends and 
the compounding effect of dividends paid on reinvested dividends. I measure 
liquidity (LIQRAT) as the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to the market 
value of total assets.
I compute SIZE, MKBK, TRT1Y  and LIQRAT  variables for each company for a 
year prior to the merger announcement. ROA  and SALEFF are calculated as the 
median of each variable for each company over three-year premerger window. 
T R T 3Y is the annualized rates of return calculated over three-year window.
3.3. Research Methodology
The parametric paired sample t-test is very powerful to test paired samples. 
However, this test requires the mean differences to be normally distributed, which is 
not met by the sample. Normality tests of the mean differences show that only 
TRT1Y (one-year market return) variable satisfies the normality condition. 
Therefore, I apply non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test throughout the study 
to test whether there are significant differences in variable values of acquirer and 
targets. I base my conclusions on the standardized test statistic Z, which for samples 
of at least 10 follows approximately a standard normal distribution.
In addition to Wilcoxon test, I use a (binomial) proportion test to determine whether 
the proportion (p) of companies experiencing greater variable values in a given 
direction. The finding that an overwhelming proportion of companies experience 
greater variable values in the same direction is as informative as a finding 
concerning the magnitude of differences in variable values.
3.4. Subsample Analysis
In addition to analyzing the full sample of merged companies, I perform similar tests 
for subsamples divided according to below-specified criteria.
1. Business Overlap Subsamples: The business overlap degree of acquirer and target 
industries may be effective on the premerger discrimination between acquirer and 
targets. Premerger discrimination pattern are hypothesized to be different in 
related and diversifying mergers. I divide sample into two different subsamples 
based on the business overlap degree of acquirer and targets. Related mergers are
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merger cases between those acquirer and target companies whose at least three 
first SIC Code1 numbers are the same, whereas the remaining mergers are 
classified as diversifying mergers. The sample analysis shows that 33 (59 %) out 
of 56 mergers are related mergers, whereas 23 (41 %) cases are diversifying 
mergers.
2. Method o f Payment Subsamples: If the merger is cash-financed, it is usually 
assumed that acquirer is much larger than target and retain higher liquidity for the 
bid purposes. The properties of acquirer and targets are hypothesized to have a 
deep trace on the selection of method of payment in mergers. To analyze this 
hypothesis, I divide total sample into three subsets based on the form of payment. 
The first subset is called equity-financed and includes cases where only the 
acquirer’s common stock was used to pay for an acquisition. The second subset 
is called cash-financed and includes cases where only cash was used for payment. 
The third subset is called mixed-financed and includes all other cases in which 
the payment terms were neither pure stock nor pure cash. In some cases, both 
stock and cash were used and in other cases cash and senior securities were used. 
Sample analysis show that 33 (59%) out of 56 mergers are equity-financed 
mergers, whereas 12 (21%) cases are cash-financed and 11 (20%) cases are 
mixed-financed.
3. Value-Growth Subsamples: The merger decision may be viewed as portfolio 
diversification decision aiming to strengthen growth or cash flow dimensions. 
The impact of acquirer’s price to book ratios on the selection of targets should be 
scrutinized to gain information about portfolio shifts of the acquirer companies. I 
rank the mergers into separate subsamples based on acquirers’ price to book ratio 
relative to their industries’ price to book ratio at the beginning of the year of 
merger announcement. Acquirer companies’ price to book ratio is compared to 
the industry’s median price to book ratio in the beginning of the year prior to 
announcement. If acquirer companies’ price to book ratio is higher than their 
industry’s2 median price to book ratio book, the merger case is classified as 
‘growth’ merger, otherwise as "value" merger. As a result of this ranking, 17 
(30%) mergers appeared to be ‘value’ mergers and 39 (70%) acquirers as 
‘growth’ mergers.
1 SIC Code is the primary SIC Code assigned to companies on the COMPUSTAT database. SIC 
is a four-digit system of classification under which a concern may be identified according to its 
activity. Individual companies are assigned a four-digit Primary SIC Code by analyzing the 
product line breakdown. The product line accounting for the largest percent of sales determine 
the Primary SIC Code.
2 Industries are defined under four-digit industry primary SIC Codes in Compustat.
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results for the complete sample of 56 mergers are presented in Table 
1. I discuss whether there are significant differences between acquirer and targets 
with respect to selected variables. The subsample analyses are reported in tables 2 
through 43 for business overlap, method of payment, value-growth subsamples.
4.1. Total Sample Analysis
The full sample analysis reveals that acquirers are discriminated from targets in 
terms of size, cash flows and liquidity dimensions.
The acquirers are on average significantly larger than targets. The average acquirer 
size (6,697 million USD) is nearly three times as big as average target size (2,299 
million USD), whereas median value for acquirer size (3,317 million USD) is nearly 
four times as large as median target size (2,299 million USD) and 93 percent of all 
acquirers are bigger than their target counterparts. The Wilcoxon signed rank and 
binomial test statistics is significant at 1 percent level.
The prediction that acquirers prefer targets with a strong cash flow record is also 
supported by the merger findings. The average target three-year median cash flow 
ratio is 6 percent higher than average acquirer three-year median cash flow ratio and 
61 percent of targets retain higher cash flow record than acquirers. The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is significant at 5 percent level, whereas binomial test statistics is 
significant at 10 percent level using one-tailed test.
Though, Wilcoxon signed rank test do not yield significant results about differences 
in the liquidity ratio of target and acquirers, 62 percent of acquirers retain higher 
liquidity than targets and binomial test statistics is significant at 5 percent level. The 
acquirer median liquidity ratio is 1 percentage point higher than median target 
liquidity ratio. These results imply that acquirers retain higher liquidity than targets.
Contrary to the research predictions, no significant discrimination patterns among 
acquirer and targets are observed in terms of price to book ratios. Though, the mean 
differences are very high (8.79) in favor of targets, the standard deviation is also 
very high which leads to the statistically insignificant results. Only 52 percent of 
targets are retaining higher price to book ratios than acquirers.
Annualized three- and one-year market returns of acquirer and targets do not 
discriminate significantly in the premerger period. The similar non-significant 
discrimination pattern is observed for sales efficiency ratios. Though inconclusive, 
it appears that targets’ sales efficiency and market return record is slightly stronger 
than acquirers’.
3 Table 2 through Table 4 is provided in the appendix.
Table 1
Premerger Discrimination Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Full Sample of Mergers
I test the differences between bidder and targets across several financial dimensions. This table presents empirical results for our full sample of mergers. For 
each empirical proxy, I give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, and standard deviation of the proxy, the mean and median 
difference between bidder and targets, and a test of significance of the difference in average values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms 
whose proxy values differ as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this difference._________________________________________________________
Variables N
Bidder Mean 
(Median)
Bidder
Standard
Deviation
Target 
Mean 
(Median)
Target
Standard
Deviation
Mean 
Differences 
(Median)
Z-Statistics for  
Difference 
(Bidder and 
Target)
Percentage o f 
Mergers with 
Predicted 
Difference Patterns
Z-Statistics
for
Significance 
o f Proportion 
Differences
Size (SIZE) -  Million 55 6,697 10,798 2,299 4,338 4,397 (y 13*** 0.93 g 47***
USD (3,317) (854) (2,464)
Cash Flow Ratio 56 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.37 -0.06 1 92** 0.61 1.47*
(ROA) - % (0.12) (0.12) (-0.01)
Liquidity Ratio (LIQ) 53 0.12 0.20 0.56 3.44 -0.43 1.01 0.62 1 92**
- % (0.07) (0.06) (0.01)
Price to Book Ratio 51 4.16 3.15 12.95 57.83 -8.79 0.45 0.52 0.14
(MKBK) - % (2.99) (3.24) (-0.25)
Three-Year Total 42 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.03 0.28 0.51 0.00
Return (TRT3Y) - % (0.19) (0.16) (0.03)
One-Year Total 54 0.27 0.34 0.32 0.51 -0.05 0.63 0.53 0.27
Return (TRT1Y) - % (0.23) (0.26) (-0.03)
Sales Efficiency 56 220,636 223,477 269,759 372,998 -49,123 0.96 0.55 0.67
(SALEFF) - USD (168,174) (175,082) (-6,908)
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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4.2 Business Overlap Subsamples
The analysis of business overlap subsets for the discrimination of targets and 
acquirers provide interesting insights about the merger process. The empirical 
results reported in table 2 suggest that discrimination pattern in related mergers 
strongly differ from the discrimination pattern in the diversifying mergers.
Acquirers discriminate significantly from targets with respect to their size, liquidity, 
and price to market ratios in related mergers. Empirical results suggest that acquirers 
in related mergers are on average (median) 1.8 times (2.3 times) greater than targets. 
Acquirers in related mergers are in median 1 percent more liquid than targets. 
However, market valuation of targets is more favorable: targets in related mergers 
retain significantly higher price to book ratios than acquirers.
Though, there are insignificant differences between targets and acquirers in related 
mergers across market return dimension, average differences suggest that acquirers 
retain stronger market returns over either three- or one-year premerger windows. It 
is difficult to judge about cash flow differences between target and acquirers in 
related mergers. The operating efficiency of targets is slightly greater than acquirers.
Acquirers in diversifying mergers are discriminated significantly from targets in 
terms of size, cash flow record and past market returns. The size differences between 
average and median acquirer and targets in diversifying mergers are much greater 
than in related mergers. The acquirers are six times greater than targets on average 
and median. This result is statistically very strong. Diversifying merger targets retain 
significantly higher cash flow and one-year market return ratios than acquirers.
Though insignificant, three-year market return and operating efficiency variables of 
diversifying merger targets are stronger than their counterparts. No significant 
patterns are identified in liquidity and price to book ratio variables.
Summarizing the results for business overlap subsets, premerger discrimination 
analysis provides interesting clues about the merger motivations. It appears that 
related merger acquirers are stronger, bigger and yield higher market returns relative 
to their counterparts and they aim to exploit target’s high growth potential which is 
reflected by target’s higher price to book ratios. Significantly higher liquidity in 
acquirers is most reasonably retained to takeover targets, if merger is cash-financed 
or mixed-financed. Even if the merger is equity-financed, the acquirer retains excess 
liquidity to be prepared to launching aggressive takeover bid.
While related merger motivation is growth through takeover, diversifying merger 
acquirers try to acquire companies with stronger cash flows and create cash cows. 
It is reflected in the takeover pattern where targets have a stronger cash flow, 
operating efficiency, and market return record than acquirers. Since acquirers is 
much bigger than targets, their liquidity is much bigger than targets in absolute 
terms, considering equal liquidity ratio for acquirer and targets. Therefore, they are 
able to launch cash bids without retaining high liquidity ratios. The argument that
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diversifying merger acquirers do not aim to enter to growing industries by mergers 
is approved by higher price-to-book ratios of acquirers than targets.
4.3. Method of Payment Subsamples
Method of payment bears information content about the motivation of the takeovers. 
The research findings indicate that discrimination across financial variables between 
target and acquirers vary considerably for cash, mixed, and equity-financed mergers.
According to research findings, cash-financed merger acquirers retain on average 
(median) 12 percent (4 percent) higher liquidity ratio than targets. This higher 
liquidity combined with acquirer size, which is on average (median) 4.5 times (5 
times) bigger than targets’ allows them to launch a cash bid. In the other hand, very 
interestingly, the relative size of acquirers to targets is the greatest for cash-financed 
mergers (median relative size value is 5) compared with mixed-financed (median 
relative size value is 3.5) and equity-financed (median relative size value is 2.8) 
mergers.
Cash-financed merger targets on average and median retain higher cash flow, market 
return, and market valuation record than acquirers. These findings suggest that cash 
is offered to better performing targets.
Mixed-financed merger target and acquirers do not differ very strongly with respect 
to financial dimensions. Average mixed-financed merger acquirer’s cash flow ratio 
is 1 percent greater than target’s. Market return proxies provide mixed results, 
whereas mixed-financed merger targets are valued better than acquirer’s. The 
liquidity ratio of acquirer’s is not apparently different from targets. This result may 
mean that mixed-financed merger acquirers were not much ready to launch merger 
bid if their mixed payment bid fails.
Significant discrimination between acquirer and targets are observed in equity- 
financed mergers. Equity-financed merger targets retain significantly stronger cash 
flows and operating efficiency, whereas acquirers are more liquid than targets. No 
significant patterns are observed for market returns and price to book ratios.
4.4. Value-Growth Subsamples
Whatever the underlying motives, mergers are realized under certain strategic 
considerations. The discrimination between acquirer and targets across value- 
growth dimensions subsets provide information about strategic choices of acquirers.
The strategic analysis of mergers in the value-growth subsamples shows that value 
acquirers are trying to takeover high growth companies. The price to book ratio of 
targets is significantly (1 percent level) higher than acquirers’ in value mergers, whereas 
the cash flow ratio does not discriminate significantly between acquirer and targets.
Value acquirers retain significantly higher liquidity than their targets. This 
conclusion implies that value acquirers are launching or ready to launch cash bid if 
their stock offer fails due to the market’s low valuation.
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In the other hand, growth acquirers are attempting to takeover targets whose cash 
flow ratio significantly higher than acquirer’s. The price to book ratio of targets is 
insignificantly lower than acquirer’s in the growth mergers.
These results imply that growth acquirers are shifting their portfolios to strengthen 
their cash flows. In the other hand, value acquirers are investing in their future by 
mergers.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of the premerger discrimination study shows that acquirers discriminate 
across financial dimensions from targets and this discrimination is reflected in the 
purchasing power of acquirers and strategic motivations underlying merger event.
Acquirers appear to be significantly bigger than targets. Moreover, acquirers retain 
significantly high liquidity than targets. Combination of higher liquidity and bigger 
size implies strong financial sources of acquirers to finance the takeovers.
Acquirers are oriented to acquire companies with stronger cash flows. They do not 
attempt to acquire companies with high growth potential. No significant 
discrimination patterns are observed between acquirer and targets in terms of market 
returns, price to book ratio, and sales efficiency ratios.
Subsample analyses yield interesting insights about the merger process. Related 
merger acquirers involve in merger activities in growth dimension, whereas 
diversifying mergers prefer takeovers in cash flow dimension. Cash-financed 
merger acquirers retain higher liquidity ratio and relative target to acquirer ratio is 
highest among all subsets. This result offer that acquirers were already prepared to 
cash bids. Moreover, cash is offered to companies with stronger cash flows, whereas 
equity-financed mergers are realized in the growth dimension. The strategic analysis 
of mergers within value-growth subsamples show that growth acquirers are trying to 
strengthen their cash flows, whereas value acquirers are investing in their future by 
purchasing high-growth companies.
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deviation of the proxy, the mean and median difference between bidder and targets, and a test of significance of the difference in average values. The final 
two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values differ as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this difference.
Variables
Bidder 
Mean 
N  (Median)
Bidder
Standard
Deviation
Target
Mean
(Median)
Target
Standard
Deviation
Mean
Differences
(Median)
Z-Statistics 
fo r  
Difference 
(Bidder and 
Target)
Percentage o f 
Mergers with 
Predicted 
Difference 
Patterns
Z-Statistics 
for  
Significance 
o f Proportion 
Differences
Size (SIZE) -  Million USD
Related Mergers 32 5,212 8,317 2,903 5,537 2,309 4 0.94 5.13
(1,961) (856) (1,105)
Diversifying Mergers 23 8,827 13,520 1,459 1,307 7,368 4 11*** 0.91 4.17
(4,557) (774) (3,783)
Cash Flow Ratio (ROA) - %
Related Mergers 33 0.17 0.24 0.26 0.48 -0.09 0.97 0.55 0.35
(0.13) (0.12) (0.01)
Diversifying Mergers 23 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.09 -0.03 2 07** 0.70 2.09**
(0.11) (0.12) (-0.01)
Liquidity Ratio (LIQ) - %
Related Mergers 31 0.17 0.25 0.90 4.50 -0.73 1.61* 0.71 2.51***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.01)
Diversifying Mergers 22 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.47 0.50 0.21
(0.05) (0.05) (0.00)
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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Table 2
Premerger Discrimination Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for Business Overlap Subsamples
Continued
Z-Statistics Percentage o f Z-Statistics
for Mergers with for
Bidder Bidder Target Target Mean Difference Predicted Significance
Mean Standard Mean Standard Differences (Bidder and Difference o f Proportion
Variables N (Median) Deviation {Median) Deviation (Median) Target) Patterns Differences
Price to Book Ratio (MKBK) - %
Related Mergers 29 3.98 3.30 5.53 5.97 -1.55 1.37* 0.59 1.11
(2.98) (3.26) (-0.28)
Diversifying Mergers 21 4.41 2.99 23.27 89.25 -18.86 0.61 0.43 0.87
(3.23) (2.81) (0.42)
Three-Year Total Return (TRT3Y) -
erfv/c
Related Mergers 19 0.27 0.24 0.16 0.28 0.11 0.68 0.37 0.92
(0.20) (0.15) (0.05)
Diversifying Mergers 18 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.33 -0.07 1.07 0.67 1.65*
(0.15) (0.19) (-0.04)
One-Year Total Return (TRT1Y) - %
Related Mergers 30 0.27 0.31 0.20 0.43 0.07 0.71 0.47 0.18
(0.27) (0.26) (0.01)
Diversifying Mergers 23 0.28 0.38 0.47 0.57 -0.19 1.64* 0.61 1.25
(0.18) (0.42) (-0.24)
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) - USD
Related Mergers 33 224,896 204.609 259,603 234,468 -34,70' 0.60 0.55 0.70
(172,039) (180,414) (-8,375)
Diversifying Mergers 23 214,524 252,774 284,329 517,183 -69,805 0.73 0.57 0.83
(158,583) (144,331) (14,252)
* ** *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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Table 3
Premerger Discrimination Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for Method of Payment Subsamples
I test the differences between bidder and targets across several financial dimensions. This table presents empirical results for subsets divided 
according to method of finance. For each empirical proxy, I give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, and standard 
deviation of the proxy, the mean and median difference between bidder and targets, and a test of significance of the difference in average values. 
The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values differ as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this difference.
Variables N
Bidder
Mean
(Median)
Bidder
Standard
Deviation
Target
Mean
(Median)
Target
Standard
Deviation
Mean
Differences
(Median)
Z-Statistics 
for  
Difference 
(Bidder and 
Target)
Percentage o f 
Mergers with 
Predicted 
Difference 
Patterns
Z Statistics 
for  
Significance 
o f Binomial 
test
Size (SIZE) -  Million USD
Cash-financed 12 5,493 5,569 1,213 994 4,280 2 75*** 0.92 3.18***
(3,959) (806) (3,153)
Mixed-fmanced 11 l l , 381 19,322 1,985 2,849 9,396 2.93*** 1.00 3.62***
(3,435) (1,007) (2,428)
Equity-financed 32 5,573 7,979 2,815 5,389 2,758 4.67*** 0.91 4 7 7 ***
(2,476) (883) (1,593)
Cash Flow Ratio (ROA) - %
Cash-financed 12 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.11 -0.01 0.39 0.58 0.29
(0.12) (0.14) (-0.02)
Mixed-fmanced 11 0.13 0.05 0.23 0.26 -0.10 1.33 0.55 0.60
(0.13) (0.12) (0.01)
Equity-financed 33 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.46 -0.07 1.33* 0.64 1.74**
5k 4*3(c
(0.12)
»-I 1 CTf- « £
(0.12) (0.00)
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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Table 3
Premerger Discrimination Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for Method of Payment Subsamples (Continued)
Percentage
Z-Statistics o f Firms Z Statistics
fo r  Difference that for
Premerger Premerger Postmerger Postmerger Mean in Medians Changed Significance
Mean Standard Mean Standard Change (Pre- and as o f Binomial
Variables N (Median) Deviation (Median) Deviation (Median) post- merger) Predicted test
Liquidity Ratio (LIQ) - %
Cash-financed 11 0.18 0.35 0.06 0.07 0.12 1.15 0.64 1.21
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Mixed-fmanced 11 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 -0.02 0.62 0.55 0.60
(0.06) (0.06) (0.00)
Equity-financed 31 0.11 0.16 0.89 4.50 -0.78 0.98 0.65 1.80**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.00)
Price to Book Ratio (MKBK) - %
Cash-financed 10 3.03 1.50 3.89 7.37 -0.86 0.36 0.60 0.95
(2.91) (3.85) (-0.94)
Mixed-fmanced 9 5.39 4.30 51.00 134.00 -45.61 0.77 0.56 0.67
(4.11) (4.98) (-0.87)
Equity-financed 31 4.12 3.07 4.72 4.57 -0.60 0.22 0.48 0.00
(2.98) (2.81) (0.17)
Three-Year Total Return (TRT3Y)-
Cf-/C
Cash-financed 8 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.18 -0.02 1.26 0.63 1.06
(0.11) (0.19) (-0.08)
Mixed-fmanced 6 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.33 0.08 0.73 0.33 0.41
(0.20) (0.08) (0.12)
Equity-financed 23 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.34 0.04 0.21 0.52 0.42
(0.20) (0.18) (0.02)
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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Premerger Discrimination Analysis: Summary
Table 3
of Results from Tests of Predictions for Method of Payment Subsamples (Continued)
Variables N
Premerger 
Mean 
(Median)
Premerger
Standard
Deviation
Postmerger 
Mean 
(Median)
Postmerger
Standard
Deviation
Mean
Change
(Median)
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and 
post- merger)
Percentage 
o f Firms 
that 
Changed as 
Predicted
Z Statistics 
for 
Significance 
o f Binomial 
test
One-Year Total Return (TRT1Y) - %
Cash-financed 12 0.21 0.21 0.29 0.53 -0.08 0.71 0.58 0.87
(0.18) (0.19) (-0.01)
Mixed-financed 11 0.22 0.31 0.53 0.60 -0.31 1.96** 0.64 1.21
(0.16) (0.50) (-0.34)
Equity-financed 30 0.31 0.38 0.25 0.47 0.06 0.58 0.47 0.18
(0.30) (0.19) (0.11)
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) - USD
Cash-financed 12 232,189 299,328 187,754 153,583 44,435 0.31 0.42 0.29
(150,433) (130,756) (19,677)
Mixed-financed 11 213,965 114,981 479,696 731,428 -265,731 0.71 0.45 0.00
(170,842) (286,797) (-115,955)
Equity-financed 33 218,658 225,473 229,599 210,947 -10,941 1.42* 0.64 1.74**
(173,517) (179,763) (-6,246)
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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Table 4
Premerger Discrimination Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for Value-Growth Subsamples
I test the differences between bidder and targets across several financial dimensions. This table presents empirical results for subsets divided according to 
bidder and target’s industries overlap degree. For each empirical proxy, I give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, and standard 
deviation of the proxy, the mean and median difference between bidder and targets, and a test of significance of the difference in average values. The final 
two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values differ as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this difference.
Variables
Bidder 
Mean 
N (Median)
Bidder
Standard
Deviation
Target 
Mean 
(Median)
Target
Standard
Deviation
Mean
Differences
(Median)
Z-Statistics 
for  
Difference 
(Bidder and 
Target)
Percentage o f 
Mergers with 
Predicted 
Difference 
Patterns
Z-Statistics 
fo r  
Significance 
o f Proportion 
Differences
Size (SIZE) -  Million USD
Value 17 2,932 3,235 907 810 2,025 3 29*** 0.94 3.40***
(2,062) (656) (1,406)
Growth 38 8,338 12,459 2,922 5,088 5,416 5 24*** 0.92 5.03***
(3,985) (1,177) (2,808)
Cash Flow Ratio (ROA) - %
Value 17 0.14 0.06 0.28 0.63 -0.14 0.98 0.47 0.49
(0.12) (0.12) (0.00)
Growth 39 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.18 -0.03 2.23** 0.67 1.92**
(0.11) (0.12) (-0.01)
Liquidity Ratio (LIQ) - %
Value 15 0.22 0.35 0.09 0.10 0.13 1.82** 0.73 1.55*
(0.09) (0.07) (0.02)
Growth 37 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.34 0.59 0.99
(0.07) (0.05) (0.02)
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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Table 4
Premereer Discrimination Analysis: Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for Value-Growth Subsamples (Continued)
Variables N
Bidder 
Mean 
(Median)
Bidder
Standard
Deviation
Target
Mean
(Median)
Target
Standard
Deviation
Mean
Differences
(Median)
Z-Statistics 
fo r  
Difference 
(Bidder and 
Target)
Percentage o f  
Mergers with 
Predicted 
Difference 
Patterns
Z-Statistics 
fo r  
Significance 
o f Proportion 
Differences
Price to Book Ratio (MKBK) - %
Value 14 2.02 0.77 5.13 4.88 -3.09 3.17*** 0.93 2.94***
(1.88) (3.81) (-1.93)
Growth 36 4.96 3.34 16.45 69,50 -11.49 1.21 0.42 0.98
(3.67) (3.11) (0.56)
Three-Year Total Return (TRT3Y) -
/c
Value 11 0.20 0.33 0.21 0.32 -0.01 0.34 0.36 1.21
(0.18) (0.19) (-0 .01)
Growth 26 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.31 0.05 0.55 0.58 0.59
(0.20) (0.15) (0.05)
One-Year Total Return (TRT1Y) - %
Value 16 0.21 0.33 0.21 0.42 0.00 0.10 0.56 0.25
(0.18) (0.23) (-0.05)
Growth 37 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.54 -0.06 0.88 0.51 0.00
(0.24) (0.32) (-0.08)
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) - USD
Value 17 149,035 56,047 203,345 154,865 -54,310 1.16 0.59 0.49
(160,211) (139,914) (20,297)
Growth 39 251,846 260,132 298,708 434,094 -46,862 0.43 0.54 0.32
(172,039) (180,414) (-8,375)
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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